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The confusion associated with comprehending fundamental 
legal concepts associated with how America conducts the “War 
on Terror” centers around the unwillingness of the U.S. 
government to properly distinguish al-Qaeda unlawful enemy 
combatants from domestic jihadi terrorists. If the American 
government cannot properly differentiate between an enemy 
combatant and a domestic criminal, it is little wonder that 
attendant legal positions associated with investigation 
techniques, targeted killing, arrest, detention, rendition, trial, 
and interrogation are subject to never-ending debate. While all 
al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatants can be labeled as violent 
jihadists, not all violent jihadists are unlawful enemy 
combatants.  
Without a significant about face in leadership that is 
willing to discern the basic difference between an unlawful 
enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, America’s 
reputation will remain under a cloud of suspicion and confusion 
regarding the legality of our actions associated with two 
significant areas of critique: rendition and targeted killing vis-à-
vis unlawful enemy combatants in the War on Terror. 
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I. Introduction 
“Decisions about who, where and how to prosecute have always 
been—and must remain—the responsibility of the executive branch.”1 
—Eric Holder 
 
With the devastating terror attacks of September 11, 2001 by al-
Qaeda unlawful enemy combatants2 on the United States, terrorism is 
no longer exclusively just another criminal offense to be investigated 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and handed over to an 
Assistant U.S. Attorney for prosecution.3 If the terror attack is carried 
out by an unlawful enemy combatant, the proper rule of law is not 
domestic criminal law, but the law of war. This simple common sense 
distinction is largely lost on a bilious sea of political and ideological 
distortion. Whatever else the eleventh anniversary of the al-Qaeda 
terror attacks of September 11, 20014 signifies, it is unfortunate that 
1. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Statement of the Attorney General on the 
Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html. 
2. See infra Part II(C). 
3. See Wayne Zaideman, Fortifying Legal Approaches to the War on 
Terror: Methodologic Considerations, in PERSPECTIVES ON DETENTION, 
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISTS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FUTURE POLICY AND CONDUCT 23 (Yonah Alexander et al. eds., 2011) 
(arguing that after the 9/11 attacks, the government elevated 
counterterrorism as the first priority of the FBI in order to stop terror 
attacks on the United States before they occur). 
4. See generally 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES 1–46 (2004) (setting out a final analysis by the United States 
government of all the issues associated with the 9/11 attacks by al-
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well after the passage of a full decade there still remains great public 
confusion when it comes to comprehending fundamental legal 
concepts associated with how America conducts the War Against al-
Qaeda,5 more popularly referred to by the non-descriptive Bush-era 
phrase: “War on Terror.”6 While some may argue that the fault for 
this obfuscation rests with the lack of international consensus on 
relevant standards that should be adopted to deal with international 
terrorism7 in asymmetric warfare,8 or that the Bush-created phrase 
War on Terror itself is horribly vague,9 the root cause of this so-called 
Qaeda. On September 11, 2001, 19 members of the radical Islamic terror 
group named al-Qaeda hijacked four U.S. passenger aircraft while in 
flight (five terrorists each in three of the planes and four in the fourth 
that went down in Pennsylvania). The al-Qaeda foot soldiers 
intentionally crashed two of the aircraft into the Twin Towers of the 
World Trade Center in New York City. A third aircraft targeted the 
Pentagon in Northern Virginia. The fourth plane, United 93, went down 
in a field in Pennsylvania, most likely as a result of the heroic efforts of 
some of the passengers who stormed the al-Qaeda pilots. Almost 3,000 
people were killed in the attacks. Id.  
5. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Strengthening 
Intelligence and Aviation Security (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-strengthening-
intelligence-and-aviation-security (“We are at war. We are at war 
against al Qaeda, a far reaching network of violence and hatred that 
attacked us on 9/11, that killed nearly 3,000 innocent people and that is 
plotting to strike us again. And we will do whatever it takes to defeat 
them.”); see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4.  
6. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and 
the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.jThe 
term War on Terror was coined during the Bush Administration. 
President George W. Bush stated, “On September 11th, enemies of 
freedom committed an act of war against our country.” Id. 
7. See John F. Murphy, The Control of International Terrorism, in 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 458–61 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. 
Turner eds., 2005). As of this writing, there is no international definition 
of terrorism. Numerous attempts have been made over the years to 
develop an international definition for the term. Professor Murphy 
argues there is a need for an internationally accepted definition of 
terrorism to enforce laws against terrorist attacks.  
8. See Bryan Bender, DIA Chief Predicts Rise in “Asymmetric” Warfare, 
DEFENSE DAILY, Sept. 12, 1996. The term asymmetric warfare is of 
recent origin. It generally refers to unconventional conflicts against 
enemies that do not wear uniforms or follow the law of war. 
9. See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat Al-
Qa’eda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces—The First Year, 30 PACE 
L. REV. 340, 362–63 (2010) (discussing the confusion associated with the 
term War on Terror and supporting an Obama term “War Against Al-
Qa’eda” as better suited to describe the conflict).  
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conundrum actually centers around the unwillingness of the United 
States government to properly distinguish al-Qaeda unlawful enemy 
combatant terrorists from domestic jihadi terrorists.10  
Instead, the terms “domestic terrorist,” “domestic jihadist,” or 
just “terrorist” are frequently employed to describe all categories of 
actors—unlawful enemy combatants as well as common criminals—
leaving both domestic and international audiences puzzled as to what 
should be the proper rule of law to apply to a given act of terror. If 
the American government cannot properly differentiate between an 
enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, it is little wonder that 
attendant legal positions associated with investigation techniques, 
targeted killing, arrest, detention, rendition, trial, and interrogation 
are subject to never-ending debate. For instance, one interesting and 
overriding issue that perplexes is not whether rendition or targeted 
killing is lawful against unlawful enemy combatants—they certainly 
are—but, why it is so difficult to discern the unlawful enemy 
combatant from the domestic criminal? Is it really just a matter of 
sloppy thinking leading to sloppy application of the proper rule of 
law? 
To be certain, the term terrorism carries with it tremendous 
definitional baggage. Despite the many descriptive uses of the term 
terrorism, it is and always will be a tactic, not an ideology.11 From a 
historical perspective, the threat of terrorism is nothing new. Terror 
as a tactic is as old as human history. Similarly, those who engage in 
terrorism as a tactical use of violence can emanate from a variety of 
ideological sources, including political, social, economic, or religious.12 
As such, popular labels that incorporate the word terrorist to describe 
groups or individuals include such phrases as, “right-wing terrorists,”13 
10. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41416, 
AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 1 
(2010) (explaining that the term jihadist describes an individual who 
employs the religion of Islam to justify the desire to establish a world 
which is governed by a Muslim civil and religious system known as a 
caliphate). See also Devlin Barrett, Siobhan Gorman & Tamer El-
Ghobashy, Bin Laden Kin Nabbed, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 2013, at A1.  
11. See CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR: A HISTORY OF WARFARE 
AGAINST CIVILIANS 17–30 (2002) (discussing how terrorism is a tactic 
associated with violence in war and peace). 
12. See id. at 16.  
13. See Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and A 
World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 343 n.92 
(2009) (citing EDWARD F. MICKOLUS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
IN THE 1980S: VOLUME II 1984–1987 XIII (1989) (“Right-
wing terrorism refers to acts perpetrated by outlawed groups that do 
not seek a social revolution but resort to violence as a way to express 
and advance their political goals, such as ultra nationalism and 
anticommunism.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
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“left-wing terrorists,”14 or “eco-terrorists.”15 That said, the number 
one threat facing the United States comes from an 
ideologically/religiously linked confederation of radicalized violent 
Islamic jihadists who engage in illegal violence by means of 
terrorism.16 Some of these jihadists qualify as unlawful enemy 
combatants and some do not. While all al-Qaeda unlawful enemy 
combatants can be labeled as “violent jihadists,”17 not all violent 
jihadists are unlawful enemy combatants. In this light, violent 
jihadists that do not qualify as unlawful enemy combatants must be 
deemed domestic terrorists, but violent jihadists that do qualify as 
unlawful enemy combatants must not be labeled as domestic 
terrorists. Out of all of the nascent legal and policy issues associated 
with the armed conflict against al-Qaeda, no factor has spawned more 
public or political rhetoric. If this separation was understood and 
ASSESSMENT, RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND 
RECRUITMENT (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/ 
rightwing.pdf. The Department of Homeland Security Report not only 
labeled as right-wing extremists those individuals who are hate-oriented 
towards minorities and entertain a dislike for large centralized federal 
government authority, but also cautioned law enforcement to be aware 
that returning military combat veterans, those dissatisfied with the 
manner in which the federal government is handling the security of the 
border, and even people that inordinately embrace limited government 
might also be ripe for recruitment by right-wing extremist groups. See 
id. at 2.  
14. See BRENT L. SMITH, TERRORISM IN AMERICA: PIPE BOMBS AND PIPE 
DREAMS 24–25 (1994). Left-wing terrorists are generally characterized 
by an extreme sense of utopian egalitarianism, an extreme hatred of 
nationalism, an extreme opposition to free market capitalism, and an 
overt opposition to the armed forces. See id.  
15. See Rebecca K. Smith, “Ecoterrorism”?: A Critical Analysis of the 
Vilification of Radical Environmental Activists As Terrorists, 38 ENVTL. 
L. 537, 545–46 (2008). Eco-terrorists are generally characterized by an 
extreme dedication to protecting the so-called natural environment by 
targeting businesses and government agencies they perceive as engaging 
in actions that disrupt or harm the environment. Smith’s article 
discusses the rise of the term “eco-terrorism” and how law enforcement 
responds to the threat. Eco-terrorists use threats and violence against 
people or property for environmental reasons, often symbolically. See 
also Joshua K. Marquis & Danielle M. Weiss, Eco-Terror: Special 
Interest Terrorism, PROSECUTOR, Jan. 2005, at 30 (discussing the 
underground radical eco-terrorist group, The Earth Liberation Front). 
16. See BJELOPERA, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
17. See id. at 2 (describing violent jihadist as a synonym for “violent action 
taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs”).  
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applied, many of the legal and policy questions would quickly fall into 
place with little or no dissent.18  
The inability to set bright lines of distinction between al-Qaeda 
unlawful enemy combatants and domestic jihadists is not just a 
failure in definition; it is a failure in leadership and does tremendous 
damage to America’s commitment to abide by the proper rule of 
law.19 The United States must be able to clearly distinguish between 
common criminals and unlawful enemy combatants and then apply 
the appropriate rule of law to each category with unabashed clarity. 
The purpose of this article is to make this distinction and to forcefully 
argue that in its second term, the Obama Administration must 
drastically improve its dismal performance in articulating and 
communicating that distinction to the public. Without a significant 
about face in leadership that can actually discern the basic difference 
between an unlawful enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, 
America’s reputation will remain under a cloud of suspicion and 
confusion regarding the legality of our actions associated with two 
significant areas of critique: rendition and targeted killing vis-à-vis 
unlawful enemy combatants in the War Against al-Qaeda.  
II. Definitions 
Semantics is the study of the meaning of words. Nowhere is this 
discipline more critical than in the field of jurisprudence. The 
hallmark of any constitutional democracy is its firm commitment to 
the law, and so it is absolutely imperative that the correct rule of law 
be applied to the proper set of factual circumstances. In turn, before 
an intelligent discussion of an issue can take place, it is imperative 
that the terms of the discussion rest on solid definitions. When it 
comes to rightly dividing the differences in legal treatment between 
enemy combatants and domestic terrorists, this entails a general 
understanding of at least four key categories of concern: (1) global 
definition of terrorism; (2) American definitions of terrorism; (3) 
differentiating the enemy combatant from the unlawful enemy 
combatant; and (4) defining the domestic jihadist. Once these terms 
18. Terrorism, Rights, and National Security—A Debate on the Rights and 
Treatment of Terrorism Suspects Held by the U.S. (JURIST Student 
Assoc. & Uni. Pittsburgh Sch. L., Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.law. 
pitt.edu/media/video/6495. Jeffrey Addicott debated Susan Herman, 
President of the American Civil Liberties Union at a JURIST event. 
Addicott argued that if the United States was in an international armed 
conflict, then all of the activities conducted by the United States—from 
detention to targeted killing—was lawful. 
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009). The rule of law is 
defined in Black’s as a “substantive legal principle” and “[t]he doctrine 
that every person is subject to the ordinary law within the jurisdiction.” 
Id.  
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are set, then the issues of rendition and targeted killing can be 
understood in their proper light. 
A. Global Definition of Terrorism 
At the start of the discussion, the basic agreement of what the 
concept “terrorism” means from a global perspective is of the utmost 
priority. Unfortunately, as many commentators have discovered when 
researching this matter, consensus is not possible. While the word 
terrorism has been firmly stamped in the world’s general lexicon, 
there is still no specific international consensus for what the word 
actually means.20 This state of affairs is unfortunate because it allows 
for the word “terrorist” to be freely interchanged with the word 
“unlawful enemy combatant” or “common criminal.” In large 
measure, the lack of consensus reflects the perennial friction between 
competing national interests, but the factor of “one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter”21 represents more than simply another 
misguided postmodernist expression. For instance, murders committed 
by the Iranian-backed Hamas22 suicide bombers in Israel against 
Jewish civilians are praised by some as great heroes of martyrdom.23 
In the field of promoting a “just cause,” e.g., the destruction of the 
State of Israel, the murders employ the old saw that the ends always 
justify the means.24 To the reasonable mind, suicide bombers are 
nothing but murderers, no matter what the cause represented. A just 
cause cannot be advanced by the intentional murder of innocent 
civilians.25  
20. See JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: MATERIALS, CASES, 
COMMENTS 1–3 (6th ed. 2011); see also Gabriel Soll, Terrorism: The 
Known Element No One Can Define, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & 
DISP. RESOL. 123, 132 (2004). 
21. James J. Ward, The Root of All Evil: Expanding Criminal Liability for 
Providing Material Support to Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 471, 489 
(2008). See also Murphy supra note 7, at 458 (discussing the concept of 
labels for those who employ violence in the name of a particular cause).  
22. For an excellent discussion on the terror organization Hamas, see 
MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM IN THE 
SERVICE OF JIHAD (2006) (describing the origin and purpose of the 
terrorist organization). 
23. See Walter Reich, The Enemy at the Gates, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, 
at 14; see also J.S. Piven, Psychological, Theological, and 
Thanatological Aspects of Suicidal Terrorism, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 731, 733 (2008). 
24. See Igor Primoratz, Terrorism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/terrorism/ (last updated 
Aug. 8, 2011).  
25. See Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation Desert Storm: R.E. Lee or W.T. 
Sherman?, 136 MILITARY L. REV. 115 (1992) (reprinted in COMMAND 
MAG., July-Aug. 1992, at 38) (describing and detailing the war crimes 
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Understanding the need for a global definition on terrorism and 
the barrier posed by the related issue of the just cause syndrome, the 
former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, 
expended great effort in carving out a lucid definition for terrorism 
that would be palatable to the international community. 
Concentrating on the innocent civilian victims of terror, Annan 
offered a very short and precise definition of terrorism that eliminated 
any mention of a justification for the “cause” that motivated the act 
of terror. Following the long-standing logic for outlawing “war crimes” 
via international treaty, which does not allow any exceptions 
whatsoever to excuse grave breaches of the law of war,26 Annan 
proposed the following for adoption: 
Any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death 
or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the 
purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a 
Government or an international organization to do or abstain 
from doing any act.27 
Unfortunately, the 2005 vote on adoption of this definition by the 
world body was squashed. The General Assembly of the United 
Nations was unable to reach consensus due in large part to the fifty-
six member Organization of Islamic Cooperation (all Muslim nations) 
who insisted that any international definition of terrorism contain a 
committed by the Lincoln Administration against Southern civilian 
populations during the War Between the States). 
26. See generally The Geneva Conventions of 1949, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS 
(ICRC), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconven 
tions (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). The primary international treaties 
dealing with law of war violations for crimes committed during armed 
conflict are the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions are 
set out in four interrelated categories: (1) Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention III]; and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. All 
violations of that body of law related to international armed conflict are 
labeled war crimes and depending on the severity of the crime and are 
classified as either grave breaches of the law of war or simple breaches of 
the law of war.  
27. Estanislao Oziewicz, Annan Proposes Definition of Terrorism, CIGI 
(Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2005/03/annan-prop 
oses-definition-terrorism.  
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certain caveat.28 The Organization of Islamic Cooperation demanded 
an exception for so-called wars of “national liberation,” i.e., if the 
violence utilized is to further a “just cause,” such as the ambiguous 
concept of national liberation, then acts of terror may be tolerated as 
legitimate expressions of resistance.29 In other words, the murder of 
civilians or non-combatants is justified if the cause is just. Of course, 
those familiar with the fifty-six member group already know that they 
define terrorism internally to exclude Israelis as victims of terrorism 
and exclude the terror groups Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorists.30 
Nevertheless, if a universal definition is not possible from the 
global perspective, it is possible to at least list four key characteristics 
of terrorism that better reflect the activity: 
1. The illegal use of violence directed at civilians to produce 
fear in a target group; 
2. The continuing threat of additional future acts of violence; 
3. A predominately political or ideological character of the 
act; and 
4. The desire to mobilize or immobilize a given target group.31 
Still, the terrorist attacks that have occurred over the past few 
decades across the globe from Baghdad to Bombay have energized the 
United Nations to produce a fairly significant variety of international 
treaties making specific terrorist acts illegal.32 If there is no 
international definition of terrorism, then the acts themselves can be 
criminalized, thus avoiding the harder and more contentious issue of 
28. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 
74–126, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (emphasizing why the 
United Nations needs to address and define terrorism as a collective 
body); see also Joshua Muravchik, Editorial, The U.N.’s Terrorism 
Gap, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at M5 (discussing Annan’s proposed 
definition of terrorism and the Islamic states’ rebuttal).  
29. See Colum Lynch, Islamic Group Blocks Terror Treaty; Nations 
Demand U.N. Pact Exemption for Anti-Islraeli Militants, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 10, 2001, at A19. 
30. See Deborah Weiss, Commentary, Obama Excludes Israel from 
Counterterrorism Group: Throwing an Ally Under the Bus, WASH. 
TIMES, September 21, 2012, at B.  
31. ADDICOTT, supra note 20, at 61. 
32. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 465–73 (describing the piecemeal approach 
via international treaties and conventions, bilateral agreements, and 
regional conventions; currently, there are twelve international 
conventions related to terrorism and ten criminal acts identified as 
terrorism in various UN conventions and protocols). 
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definition. Accordingly, bombing public places, hijacking aircraft, 
taking hostages, and so on are all firmly identified as acts of 
terrorism.33 Echoing at least a hint of understanding that the targets 
of terrorism are civilians, which are the central ingredient of terror, 
whether the terror act occurs in peacetime or during war is irrelevant 
to the element of criminality.  
While the international community cannot agree on a definition of 
terrorism that is palatable to a majority of its 193 members, it 
appears that individual states have not been so constrained. The most 
curious development associated with defining terrorism since the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States is the fact that 
almost every nation in the world has adopted new “anti-terrorism 
laws.”34 According to a September 2011 survey conducted by the 
Associated Press, over 120,000 people have been arrested and over 
35,000 people worldwide have been sentenced and convicted for 
33. ADDICOTT supra note 20, at 61. Some examples of individual 
international conventions that address acts of terrorism include: The 
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S 220; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Oct. 14, 1971, 860 U.N.T.S. 
105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, Jan. 26, 1973, 974 U.N.T.S. 178; Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Feb. 20, 1977, 1035 
U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 
G.A. Res. 146 (XXXIV), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. 
Doc. A/34/46 (June 3, 1983); International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284; 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N. 
Doc. A/54/49 (Dec. 9, 1999); International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism New York, G.A. Res. 51/210, 
U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/766 (Apr. 4, 2005); 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359; Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222; Protocol on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 
1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125; and Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 
U.N.T.S. 178.  
34. See Martha Mendoza, Global Terrorism: 35,000 Worldwide Convicted 
For Terror Offenses Since September 11 Attacks, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/03/terrorism-
convictions-since-sept-11_n_947865.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. 
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terrorism offenses since 9/11.35 In a survey of sixty-six countries, 
China and Turkey accounted for over half of all convictions, with 
Pakistan accounting for the sharpest rise in terror-related arrests in 
recent years.36 In the United States, the Associated Press found that 
the number of arrests of individuals suspected of terrorism-related 
activity was 2,934,37 with 2,568 convictions.38 
At the end of the day, the most pressing matter in the era of the 
War on Terror is the need for an international definition. Without 
such, the term continues to be treated as a political piñata.  
B. American Definitions of Terrorism 
Anyone marginally familiar with how American criminal law 
addresses terrorism as a criminal act is cognizant of the fact that 
there are a number of slightly different definitions of terrorism 
scattered across a broad variety of federal statutes. In the United 
States, definitional distinctions are made between domestic terrorism 
and international terrorism. For instance, the Department of Justice 
defines the term terrorism (referring to domestic terrorism) as “the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”39 The 
Department of Justice defines “international terrorism” as violent 
actions that would be federal or state crimes designed to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population or government and that occur primarily 
outside of the United States.40 
35. See id. 
36. See id. Pakistan’s conviction rate for terrorism arrests sits at only 10% 
of cases. Id. 
37. Id. But see ADDICOTT, supra note 20, at 130–31 (pointing out that the 
number of prosecutions for major acts of terrorism or attempted 
terrorism in the United States are far lower than for “terrorism-related” 
activity). 
38. See Mendoza, supra note 34.  
39. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2010).  
40. See id. However, numerous federal statutes exist that offer slightly 
different definitions of terrorism, for example:  
(1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that—  
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that 
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or 
of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if 
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or 
of any State;  
(B) appear to be intended—  
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
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Perhaps the best source to consult for definitions from the 
standpoint of the post-9/11 American perspective on terrorism is the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA 
PATRIOT Act).41 Designed to increase the ability of law enforcement 
and intelligence agents to address the threat of terrorist attacks, the 
USA PATRIOT Act actually created no new laws. In order to better 
counter acts of terrorism, the USA PATRIOT Act simply amends 
existing federal laws to ease restrictions and streamline processes 
regarding activities such as the lawful search of emails, telephone 
records, financial transactions, and other records.42 The USA 
PATRIOT Act also enhanced America’s ability to detain and deport 
certain aliens suspected of terrorist activities. To date, despite being 
demonized by various ideologues,43 no provision of the USA 
PATRIOT Act has been overturned as unconstitutional by any of the 
federal circuit courts.  
In the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress set out specific definitions 
for the terms “terrorist organization,” “international terrorism,” and 
“domestic terrorism.” A terrorist organization is defined as one that 
is: 
(1) designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist 
organization under the process established under current 
law;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or  
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and  
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of 
the means by which they are accomplished, the persons 
they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale 
in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.  
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2009). 
41. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C §§ 1861-
1863 (Supp. I 2001)) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]. 
42. For a good discussion of the general provisions of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, see John T. Soma et al., Balance of Privacy vs. Security: A 
Historical Perspective of the USA Patriot Act, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECH. L.J. 285 (2005). 
43. See, e.g., Heather Hilary & Nancy Kubasek, The Remaining Perils of 
the Patriot Act: A Primer, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 1 (2007). 
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(2) designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist 
organization for immigration purposes; or  
(3) a group of two or more individuals that commits terrorist 
activities or plans or prepares to commit (including 
locating targets for) terrorist activities.44 
 
According the USA PATRIOT ACT, international terrorism 
involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate the 
criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United 
States or any state. These acts appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by 
assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside 
the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of how 
terrorists accomplish them, the persons they appear intended to 
coerce or intimidate, or the place in which the perpetrators operate.45 
The phrase domestic terrorism is found in Section 802 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and is defined as a person who engages in actions: 
(A) dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or any State; 
(B) appear to be intended—  
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion; or  
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.46  
If the acts occur outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, they may be regarded as international terrorism.  
Under the current American approach, whether from the view of 
the Justice Department or the USA PATRIOT Act, the main 
distinction between an international terrorist and a domestic terrorist 
rests in geography. If the act takes place in the United States, then 
the phrase domestic terrorism applies, regardless of whether the actor 
44. See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 41, § 411(a)(1)(G). 
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2331.  
46. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 41, § 802.  
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is an enemy combatant or a common criminal. A similar definitional 
approach is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2331, where: 
(1) the term domestic terrorism means activities that— 
 
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
 
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.47 
 
Except in the limited context of military commissions,48 the 
Congress has not crafted a definition of terrorism where the language 
turns on the status of the individual planning on, or embarking on, an 
act of terror. Without such, the various definitions found in federal 
criminal statutes are of little value in terms of rightly dividing the 
unlawful enemy combatant who uses terror as a tactic of war from the 
domestic jihadist who uses terror as a tactic of hatred. 
C. Enemy Combatant Versus Unlawful Enemy Combatant 
The term enemy combatant is a phrase associated only with the 
rule of law that regulates lawful behavior in an international armed 
conflict. The term enemy combatant was used regularly by the Bush 
Administration and has been adopted as a term of art in most federal 
court cases which deal with detention issues, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court.49 In its broadest sense, the term enemy combatant 
describes a person that is subject to the provisions of the law of war.  
On those rare occasions when President Obama addresses the 
issue of the enemy combatant, he prefers to use either a longer 
descriptive term which identifies an enemy combatant as those 
individuals who may be detained (or killed) as persons subject to the 
congressional provisions of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2331.  
48. See infra notes 73, 76 and accompanying text. 
49. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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Force,50 or the shorter phrase “unprivileged enemy belligerent” coined 
by the Democrat-controlled Congress and found in the 2009 Military 
Commissions Act.51 When arguing before the federal courts, President 
Obama apparently exercises his authority to detain enemy 
combatants only under the congressional provisions and not as part of 
his Article II powers as the commander-in-chief.52 In the minds of 
some, this reflects the attitude that only Congress has the power to 
make war,53 but President Obama does not necessarily hold this 
view.54 On other occasions, for instance, the Obama Administration 
does employ Article II authority as one legal justification to conduct 
targeted attacks by drone strikes.55 
Regardless of the Obama Administration’s reluctance to employ 
the term unlawful enemy combatant, the very label of enemy 
combatant is a direct byproduct of the corpus of the law of war and 
has no real meaning outside of that usage. The law of war, also 
known as the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law, 
consists of all of those laws, by treaty and customary principles, 
which are applicable to international warfare,56 i.e., when two or more 
parties engage in armed conflict. Regardless of how an individual 
state or party to the conflict chooses to declare war, the law of war 
applies. The cornerstone of the law of war is the well-recognized 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.57 The Geneva Conventions cover four 
50. S. J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted). See also Respondent’s 
Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay 
Detainee Litigation, No. 08-0442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009). 
51. Contained in Title XVIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111–84, 123 Stat. 2190.  
52. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The primary language setting out 
executive authority is derived from Article II of the Constitution which 
provides that the President “shall be the Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States.” Id. 
53. See Louis Fisher, Only Congress Can Declare War, ABA J., Feb. 2012, 
at 37 (arguing that the President does not have the authority to “take 
the country from a state of peace to a state of war”). See also U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
54. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Attack Renews Debate over Congressional 
Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at A14. 
55. See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Speech at Northwestern 
University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) (explaining that customary international 
law also makes up the law of war and consists of all those binding norms 
practiced by nations). 
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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broad categories of activity: wounded and sick military on the ground; 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military at sea; treatment of 
prisoners of war; and protections for civilians in war.58 
There is, of course, a difference between an enemy combatant and 
an unlawful enemy combatant. Article 4(1) of the Geneva Convention 
of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
defines the enemy combatant, in the context of prisoner of war, as, 
“[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed 
forces.”59 Precisely mirroring the Geneva Conventions and all existing 
international laws associated with the conduct of armed conflict,60 the 
U.S. Army (which has primary proponency over the other branches of 
the military for the law of war) has codified all of the legal provisions 
associated with law of war in Field Manual 27-10, Department of the 
Army Field Manual of the Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10).61 The 
law of war is focused both on the proper targeting of military 
objectives and the treatment of enemy detainees, prisoners of war, 
and other noncombatants. Accordingly, those who qualify as enemy 
combatants are defined in FM 27-10 as “[m]embers of armed forces of 
a Party to the conflict” or “members of other militias and members of 
other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance 
movements, belonging to a Party . . . provided that such . . . fulfill[s]” 
four specific conditions: (1) that of being commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates; (2) that of having a fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance; (3) that of carrying arms openly; and 
(4) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war.62  
On the other hand, those who engage in wartime violence that do 
not fulfill the legal requirements to qualify as enemy combatant 
prisoners of war, if captured, are deemed to be unlawful enemy 
combatants.63 Since the prisoner of war status64 is only conferred on 
58. See supra note 26 id. 
59. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 26, art. 4(1). 
60. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 56, § 102. 
61. DEP’T OF THE U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUEL 27-10, THE LAW OF ARMED 
WARFARE (1956). FM 27-10 affirms that the basic goal of the law of war 
is to limit the impact of the inevitable evils of war by: “(a) Protecting 
both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; (b) 
Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into 
the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and 
sick, and civilians; and (c) facilitating the restoration of peace. Id. ¶ 2.  
62. Id. ¶ 61.  
63. See infra note 76 and accompanying text regarding military 
commissions. 
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persons who are lawful enemy combatants, paragraph 60(b) of FM 27-
10 indicates that “[p]ersons who are not members of the armed forces 
as defined in [the Geneva Conventions], who bear arms or engage in 
other conduct hostile to the enemy thereby deprive themselves of 
many of the privileges attaching to the members of the civilian 
population.”65  
The friction in the analysis is that the al-Qaeda network is not a 
“Party” to the Geneva Conventions, let alone a state; they are at 
most non-state actors. Still, as non-uniformed combatants without 
fixed distinctive signs that do not follow the law of war, al-Qaeda 
members are properly classified as unlawful enemy combatants. As a 
practical matter, since both groups can be killed and detained66 in 
accordance with the lawful use of force associated with war, the main 
difference in treatment between an unlawful enemy combatant and a 
lawful enemy combatant is related to interrogation issues. An 
unlawful enemy combatant can be interrogated as long as the 
techniques do not violate international law such as the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment,67 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions,68 or 
any other self-imposed domestic restrictions. In turn, the unlawful 
enemy combatant, along with a lawful enemy combatant who 
64. Geneva Convention III, supra note 26 art. 17. Article 17 of Geneva 
Convention III provides that prisoners of war are only required to give 
their “surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, 
regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent 
information.” Id. The prisoner of war is not required to give any further 
information upon questioning. To leave no doubt on this point, Article 
17 goes on to provide the following: “No physical or mental torture, nor 
any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to 
secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war 
who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any 
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” Id.  
65. DEP’T OF U.S. ARMY, supra note 61, ¶ 60(b). 
66. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 523 (2004) (plurality opinion 
holding that a U.S. citizen captured in combat operations in 
Afghanistan could be detained as an enemy combatant). 
67. See G.A. Res. 39/46(I), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. 
Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984). The Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment sets 
out prohibited treatment by governments for all persons and the 
universal rejection of “torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment throughout the world.” Although the 
international convention provides a definition of torture in terms of 
“severe pain or suffering”, it lacks any definition of “other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.” Id. 
68. Geneva Convention III, supra note 26, art. 3. 
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commits a war crime, can be prosecuted for war crimes by means of 
military commissions.69  
The most significant byproduct of the Supreme Court ruling in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld70 was the passage of the 2006 Military 
Commissions Act71 (passed by a Republican-controlled Congress) to 
authorize the prosecution of certain unlawful enemy combatants by 
means of military commissions for listed crimes and war crimes.72 Not 
only did this law strongly refute all reasonable doubt that Congress 
did believe that the War on Terror was a real war against al-Qaeda 
and its direct partners, Congress provided a crystal-clear definition of 
who qualified as an unlawful enemy combatant. Military commissions 
were established by federal law and authorized to try “any alien 
unlawful enemy combatant” (a non-US citizen member of al-Qaeda) 
defined as:  
 
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against 
the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful 
enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the 
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or  
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the 
enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has 
been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent 
tribunal established under the authority of the President or 
the Secretary of Defense.73 
 
Shortly after President Obama took office, the Democrat-
controlled Congress passed the 2009 Military Commissions Act,74 
which provided some additional due process protections for the 
accused and, for obvious political expediency, changed the 2006 
Military Commissions Act phrase “unlawful enemy combatant” to 
“unprivileged enemy belligerent.”75 As noted, the two designations are 
69. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a) (“An Act to authorize trial by 
military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other 
purposes.”).  
70. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
71. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
120 Stat. 2600. 
72. Id. § 948b(a). 
73. Id. § 948a(1)–(2). 
74. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1801–07, 123 
Stat. 2190 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a). 
75. Id. § 948a(6)–(9). 
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identical in meaning and most still prefer the simpler phrase unlawful 
enemy combatant over the unfamiliar unprivileged enemy belligerent. 
The 2009 Military Commissions Act retained specific language 
identifying an al-Qaeda member as an unlawful enemy combatant. 
The 2009 Military Commissions Act defined its unprivileged enemy 
belligerent in the War on Terror as:  
[A]n individual (other than a privileged belligerent) [unlawful 
enemy combatant] who—  
(A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners;  
(B) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners; or  
(C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the offense under this 
chapter.76  
  
Although both the 2006 and 2009 Military Commissions Act can 
be faulted for self-imposing an exclusion for U.S. citizen al-Qaeda 
members as candidates for trial by military commission, both 
congressional acts fully acknowledge the existence and validity of the 
unlawful enemy combatant and that the proper rule of law to apply is 
not domestic criminal law but rather the law of war. However, this 
simple point of clarity never took hold in the Obama 
Administration;77 President Obama attempted to stop the military 
commissions process immediately upon taking office.78 
The last major Supreme Court decision to deal with issues 
associated with the enemy combatant in the War on Terror was the 
2008 Boumediene v. Bush ruling.79 In discussing habeas corpus rights 
for alleged unlawful enemy combatant detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 
Boumediene specifically used the term enemy combatant throughout 
the opinion in a manner that directly mirrored Congress’ 2006 
Military Commissions Act definition.80 Without carving out an 
exception for a U.S. citizen, the Court, adopting the executive 
branch’s definition of the term enemy combatant, stated “an ‘enemy 
combatant’ is an individual who . . . was ‘part of or supporting forces 
76. Id. § 948a(7). 
77. See Holder, supra note 1 (announcing the Obama Administration’s 
intent to try Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four other individuals in 
federal court for their role in the 9/11 attacks). 
78. See infra notes 123, 124 and accompanying text. 
79. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
80. See e.g., id. at 732, 733, 734. See also Military Commissions Act of 2006 
§ 948a(1)–(2) (defining an enemy combatant). 
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hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and 
who ‘engaged in armed conflict against the United States’ there.”81 
Despite the fact that various so-called “human rights” groups, 
including the International Committee of the Red Cross, have 
regularly accused the United States of violations of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),82 for not 
extending prisoners of war status to detained enemy combatants,83 the 
Bush Administration refused to apply both the Third Geneva 
Convention Relative to Prisoners of War Protections as well as 
Protocol I to unlawful enemy combatants.84 In short, the Bush 
Administration decided that said enemy combatants failed to qualify 
as lawful enemy combatants under the applicable provisions of 
international law. The Obama Administration has adopted the Bush 
position in this regard.85  
Apart from the Boumediene decision extending habeas rights to 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay to review their status as unlawful 
enemy combatants, the most significant layer of due process 
protections for current unlawful enemy combatants came in the 2006 
Supreme Court ruling in Hamdan.86 While Hamdan focused on the 
detainees held at the military facility at Guantanamo Bay, all 
unlawful enemy combatants (the Obama Administration now holds 
most at the new multi-million dollar Bagram Air Force Base 
Detention Facility in Afghanistan87) are now entitled to the additional 
81. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004). 
82. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1946, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  
83. The legal basis most often asserted is that Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 would accord prisoner of war 
status to any enemy combatant—legal or unlawful. However, the United 
States never adopted Protocol I, for the very reason that it bestowed a 
legal status on non-uniformed combatants. Thus, the idea that Protocol 
I is binding on the United States as a principal of “customary 
international law” is correct only in part. The United States is not 
bound by Protocol I in this regard and is perfectly within its legal rights 
to interrogate non-uniformed combatants; these individuals are not 
entitled to the protections given to prisoners of war. See id. art. 44.  
84. See Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 1025, 1025–26 (2004). 
85. Addicott, supra note 9, at 350. 
86. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
87. See Bagram Detention Center (Afghanistan), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics. 
nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/bagram_air_base_a
fghanistan/index.html (last updated Nov. 19, 2012) (noting there are 
over 3,000 people detained at Bagram, compared to 170 at 
Guantanamo).  
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protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.88 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions states in pertinent 
part: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum, the following provisions:  
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms 
and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded 
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by 
a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.89 
 
Attempting to add clarity to the issue of detention authority for 
unlawful enemy combatants deemed to be “persons captured in 
connection with hostilities” in the War on Terror, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012 (NDA FY 2012)90 
included a statutory definition of those individuals who would qualify 
for indefinite detention. In section 1021(b) the NDA FY 2012, a 
covered person includes:  
88. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631–32. 
89. Geneva Convention III, supra note 26, art. 3(1).  
90. JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41920, DETAINEE PROVISIONS IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 
AUTHORIZATION BILLS 1 (2011). 
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(1)  A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored those responsible for those attacks. 
 
(2) A person who was part of or substantially supported al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, 
including any person who has committed a belligerent act 
or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such 
enemy forces.91 
 
In summary, enemy combatant is a phrase that applies in time of 
war and encompasses both the lawful enemy combatant and the 
unlawful enemy combatant. Unlawful enemy combatants, like lawful 
enemy combatants, may be killed on sight in accordance with the 
proper targeting considerations.92 If captured, the unlawful enemy 
combatant, like the lawful enemy combatant, may be detained 
indefinitely until the war is over.93 Only the unlawful enemy 
combatant may be questioned beyond name, rank, and serial number, 
so long as the interrogation does not constitute an outrage “upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.” 
The enemy in the War on Terror is properly designated as an 
unlawful enemy combatant. 
D. Domestic Jihadist 
Prior to September 11, 2001, and the start of the war against the 
al-Qaeda terrorist organization, when one spoke of domestic terrorism 
it was meant to describe the use of illegal violence by an individual 
(or group of individuals) by means of an act of terrorism within the 
physical territory of the United States—on the American homeland. If 
apprehended, this individual was invariably prosecuted in a federal 
district court for violation of various federal criminal law statutes 
associated with the specific criminal act.94 In the context of domestic 
91. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-190, § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). 
92. See infra part IV. 
93. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). See also Remarks by Alberto R. 
Gonzales before the American Bar Association Standing Committee on 
Law and National Security (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www. 
abanet.org/natsecurity/judge_gonzales.pdf. 
94. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 1999). The blind 
Sheik, Omar Abdel Rahman, and eight other co-defendants were 
convicted of various federal crimes for the 1993 bombing of the World 
Trade Center in New York. All were motivated by radical Islam to 
conspire and conduct the terror attack. See id. at 103–05.  
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terrorism, nothing has changed. Regardless of the motivation, the 
domestic terrorist who engages in criminal activity is treated under 
the rule of law associated with domestic criminal activity. Since the 
FBI is the lead authority for investigating terrorism, such a case is 
almost always turned over to the federal government for prosecution 
under federal law.  
Understanding the reality that the number one threat facing the 
nation emanates from domestic terrorists motivated by radical Islam, 
the Obama Administration adopted the new term “domestic 
jihadist.”95 While this term is valid to describe those that violate 
criminal laws to include terrorism statutes, it should not be used in 
the context of enemy combatants. 
Many Americans and non-Americans have been infected with the 
virus of radical Islam. While these individuals are not valid al-Qaeda 
members, it is certain that their religious beliefs cause them to 
conduct or attempt to conduct terrorism on the soil of the United 
States in the name of “jihad,” or holy war.96 Of course, not all acts of 
terrorism targeting America are caused by jihadists, but this 
murderous movement of radical Islam eclipses all other individuals or 
groups who employ terror. The ideology of radical Islam influences the 
minds of individuals who, although not directly tied to the al-Qaeda 
organization, choose to commit terrorist acts because they have 
adopted the general theme and goal of al-Qaeda.97 According to the 
2013 Congressional Research Service Report (CRS) entitled American 
Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, a jihadist includes 
any radicalized person who employs the religion of Islam to justify 
terrorism.98 Understanding that the jihadist targets domestic 
audiences, the phrase domestic jihadist is a merger of terms. 
According to the CRS Report, “homegrown” and “domestic” are 
terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the 
United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent 
residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States.99 
The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an 
ideological/religious justification for their belief in the establishment 
of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and 
religious leader known as a caliph.100  
95. See BJELOPERA, supra note 10, at 5 n.3. 
96. See Jeffery F. Addicott, The Misuse of Religion in the Global War on 
Terrorism, 7 BARRY L. REV. 109, 112–16 (2006) (describing the 
motivation for jihadism as a distorted view of the grace mechanics of 
Biblical Christianity to achieve salvation). 
97. See id. at 116. 
98. See BJELOPERA, supra note 10, at 1. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
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Even though the CRS Report ignores the fact that al-Qaeda 
unlawful enemy combatants, who are obviously also jihadists, have 
conducted attacks on the American homeland, illustrations of the 
growing threat posed by jihadists that are not unlawful enemy 
combatants are many and growing in number. Indeed, since the start 
of the Obama Administration the pace of domestic jihadist-inspired 
terrorism on U.S. soil has reached an all-time high. Between May 
2009 and December 2012, “arrests were made in 47 ‘homegrown,’ 
jihadist-inspired”101 terror plots. The most heinous attack by a radical 
jihadist occurred in the cold-blooded murder of thirteen soldiers at 
Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, by Army officer Nidal Malik 
Hasan.102 Because Hasan was in the military and the terror attack 
occurred on a military installation, the Obama Administration’s 
Department of Justice declined primary jurisdiction and allowed the 
military to prosecute him under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.103 As stated, in all cases of terrorism—whether motivated by 
jihadist beliefs or some other cause—the Department of Justice has 
the lead authority to prosecute under federal criminal law and the 
FBI has the lead authority to investigate.104 In fact, the federal 
district courts have prosecuted (and continue to prosecute) jihadists105 
and other non-jihadist terrorists, such as Timothy McVeigh who 
killed 167 people in a bomb attack in 1995.106  
A continuing dilemma for the federal government in confronting 
the threat of the domestic jihadist is that an overly lengthy 
investigation of a particular terror plot may provide a window of 
opportunity for the suspect to actually carry out the attack. In the 
early years following the attacks of 9/11, this potential delay caused 
the Department of Justice to officially adopt a policy of “anticipatory 
prosecution” or “pre-emptive prosecution.” Fearing another 
devastating attack similar to September 11, 2001, the government 
sometimes moves in and arrests a suspected domestic jihadist at the 
earliest possible opportunity in a given investigation, as opposed to 
letting a particular terror plot mature. The downside, of course, is 
that the suspect is often charged with lesser offenses or even offenses 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 17. 
103. UCMJ, art. 2(a).  
104. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2012–2016 STRATEGIC PLAN 
12–13 (2012). 
105. See ADDICOTT, supra note 20, at 525–44 (listing the “Islamic” terrorists 
that were charged or convicted in U.S. federal courts between 2002 and 
2010). 
106. Mireya Navarro, At Fair for Survivalists, Fallout From Oklahoma, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/12/us/at-fair-
for-survivalists-fallout-from-oklahoma.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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that have nothing to do with terrorism. A September 11, 2008, 
Department of Justice document entitled Fact Sheet: Justice 
Department Counter-Terrorism Efforts Since 9/11 explains:  
In each of these cases, the Department [of Justice] has faced 
critical decisions on when to bring criminal charges, given that a 
decision to prosecute a suspect exposes the Government’s 
interest in that person and effectively ends covert intelligence 
investigation. Such determinations require the careful balancing 
of competing interests, including the immediate incapacitation 
of a suspect and disruption of terrorist activities through 
prosecution, on the one hand; and the continuation of 
intelligence collection about the suspect’s plans, capabilities, and 
confederates, on the other; as well as the inherent risk that a 
suspect could carry out a violent act while investigators and 
prosecutors attempt to perfect their evidence.  
 
While it might be easier to secure convictions after an attack has 
occurred and innocent lives are lost, in such circumstances, the 
Department would be failing in its fundamental mission to protect 
America and its citizens, despite a court victory. For these reasons, 
the Department continues to act against terror threats as soon as the 
law, evidence, and unique circumstances of each case permit, using 
any charge available.107  
There are a variety of federal criminal statutes that deal with 
domestic terrorism, including the broadly written weapons of mass 
destruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a.108 The primary federal law for 
prosecuting those accused of engaging in domestic terrorism is the 
Clinton-era Material Support Act, which first appeared in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.109 Set out in 
two sections, the Material Support Act makes it a criminal offense for 
anyone to provide material support or resources in aid of terrorist 
offenses or to provide material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist group so designated by the Secretary of State.110 Knowingly 
providing material support to terrorists is a crime under 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2339A111 and providing material support or resources to a 
designated foreign terrorist organization is also a federal crime under 
107. Factsheet: Justice Department Counter—Terrorism Efforts Since 9/11, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-nsd-807.html. 
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2004). 
109. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2009).  
110. See id. 
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 
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18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B.112 To date, federal judges have largely upheld 
the legality of the statute and numerous jihadists have been 
convicted.113 Despite complaints that the statute was overly broad 
and vague in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,114 the Supreme 
Court soundly rejected the idea that the Material Support Act was 
unconstitutionally vague.115 
III. Mixed Signals—Blurring the Line Between 
Domestic Jihadist and Unlawful Enemy Combatant 
Since the inception of the War on Terror, the rule of law made a 
dramatic shift from the well-worn processes of domestic criminal law 
to the not-often-employed law of war. Congress authorized the 
president (as the commander-in-chief) in the 2001 Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force to use the law of war with “all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons 
he determines” were responsible for the terror attacks on 9/11.116 In 
the Act, Congress gave the president unilateral power to determine 
who is an unlawful enemy combatant.117 Nevertheless, in the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Congress specifically identified those that 
would qualify for treatment as unlawful enemy combatants—the 
Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated forces.118 Similarly, in the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009, Congress altered the phrase unlawful 
enemy combatant to “unprivileged enemy belligerent,”119 but still 
clearly listed al-Qaeda as a belligerent, along with anyone other than 
a privileged belligerent who engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners.120 
Given that the War on Terror presents new challenges to the old 
thinking associated with traditional forms of war in that the enemy is 
not from a specific state, does not wear a uniform, and does not abide 
by the law of war, it is still unacceptable that the United States has 
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
113. See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: 
Perspectives Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1:5 NAT’L 
SEC. L. & POL’Y 5, 9 (2005). 
114. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
115. See id. at 2719–20.  
116. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
117. See id. at pmbl. 
118. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 48a, 120 
Stat. 2600. 
119. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 948a(5)–(6), 
123 Stat. 2190. 
120. Id. § 948a(7)(c). 
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not been able to formulate at least the most basic of status 
distinctions between an unlawful enemy combatant and a domestic 
jihadist criminal. If instances of this confusion abound from the 
leadership it is little wonder that the average citizen is left in a 
constant state of total frustration.  
While the Bush Administration certainly demonstrated mixed 
signals in this regard, the Obama Administration has exhibited what 
can only be described as a sycophantic approach. Beginning with a 
pedestrian set of executive orders associated with enemy combatants 
in early 2009, the Obama Administration has been unable or 
unwilling to provide a bright-line distinction between domestic 
terrorism conducted by domestic jihadists and acts of war carried out 
by unlawful enemy combatants.121  
To be certain, the lack of clarity on treating the enemy 
combatant exclusively under the law of war began in the Bush 
Administration, not the Obama Administration. To its credit, when 
the War on Terror began, the Bush Administration was able to shift 
away from domestic criminal processes that had been used against all 
categories of “terrorists” to include the case of Sheik Omar Abdel 
Rahman, who orchestrated the 1993 radical Islamic terror attack on 
the World Trade Center.122 Both President Bush and Congress saw al-
Qaeda and their direct supporters as unlawful enemy combatants and 
subject to the law of war. Thus, President Bush exhibited a certain 
degree of determination to employ the law of war consistently to 
those whom he labeled as unlawful enemy combatants. As such, the 
Bush Administration used the law of war against al-Qaeda forces to 
kill them, detain them indefinitely, and to use military commissions. 
Nevertheless, there were glaring exceptions where political 
considerations, which demanded a demonstration of accomplishment, 
trumped consistency in applying the law of war across the board. For 
instance, while correctly proclaiming that the law of war allowed the 
use of military commissions for those non-U.S. citizen al-Qaeda 
members who committed crimes in violation of the law of war, the 
Bush Administration chose to prosecute two al-Qaeda members in 
federal district court: Zacarias Moussaoui (the so-called twentieth al-
Qaeda terror plot hijacker of September 11, 2001)123 and Richard Reid 
(the British al-Qaeda shoe bomber).124  
121. See David Johnston & Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama’s Plan for Closing 
Guantanamo Faces Legal and Logistical Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2009, at A14; Tung Yin, “Anything but Bush?”: The Obama 
Administration and Guantanamo Bay, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453, 
457 (2011). 
122. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 103–04 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
123. United States v. Moussaoui, Indictment, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. 2005). 
Zacarias Moussaoui entered a guilty plea to charges that he conspired to 
hijack planes and fly them into the World Trade Center and the 
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The Bush decision to deal with Moussaoui and Reid as domestic 
jihadists and not unlawful enemy combatants did not go unnoticed by 
the Obama Administration. In the Obama Administration’s 
continuing desire to marginalize the use of military commissions and 
rely on domestic criminal courts for unlawful enemy combatants, 
Attorney General Holder points out that President Bush “consistently 
relied on criminal prosecutions in federal court to bring terrorists to 
justice . . . attempted shoe bomber Richard Reid and 9/11 conspirator 
Zacarias Moussaoui were among the hundreds of defendants convicted 
of terrorism-related offenses.”125 Of course, Holder falls into a logical 
mouse-trap. While it is true that Reid and Moussaoui were al-Qaeda 
unlawful enemy combatants, it is absolutely not true that the 
hundreds of other defendants convicted of domestic jihadist terrorism 
offenses were al-Qaeda. In other words, Reid and Moussaoui could 
have been sent to Guantanamo Bay as unlawful enemy combatants to 
await trial by military commission, but not the others convicted in 
the Bush Administration. Only enemy combatants can be tried by 
military commissions. 
Instead of correcting the Bush-era missteps, and dealing with acts 
of domestic jihadist terrorism based on the designation of the actor 
into his proper legal category, President Obama’s confused policies in 
the War on Terror have sown even greater consternation. Not only 
does the president rarely make public announcements about the fact 
that America is at war with al-Qaeda,126 he seems intent on forcing a 
Pentagon. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.2d 263, 266–78 (4th 
Cir. Jan. 10, 2010) (discussing the procedural history); Moussaoui 
Pleads Guilty to Terror Charges, CNN (Apr. 23, 2005), http://www.   
cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/22/moussaoui/index.html. At the sentencing 
stage of the three-year federal trial, a jury sentenced Moussaoui to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole instead of the death penalty, 
which the government was seeking; see Moussaoui, 591 F.2d at 277; see 
also Moussaoui Formally Sentenced, Still Defiant, MSNBC (May 4, 
2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12615601/. 
124. United States v. Reid, 211 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Mass. 2008). Richard 
Reid was convicted of attempting to blow up American Airlines Flight 
63 from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001 with a makeshift bomb in 
his shoe. He was convicted of multiple life sentences in a federal district 
court in December 2003. See also United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 
619–20 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the procedural history); Exchange 
Between Reid, Judge Follows Life Sentence, CNN (Dec. 6, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/30/shoebomber.sentencing/. 
125. Holder, supra note 55.  
126. See President Barack Obama, supra note 5. One of the rare public 
statements by President Obama that recognized that the United States 
was at war with al-Qaeda occurred in the wake of the attempted plane 
bombing by al-Qaeda member Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in 
December 2009: “We are at war. We are at war against al Qaeda, a far-
reaching network of violence and hatred that attacked us on 9/11, that 
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return to the use of domestic criminal law to cover unlawful enemy 
combatants, even if the terror acts occurred outside of the American 
homeland.127 The Obama executive orders referenced earlier provide 
ample proof of this intent. Shortly after being sworn, President 
Obama issued three executive orders on January 22, 2009. Obama 
ordered: (1) the closure of Guantanamo Bay within one year;128 (2) 
the suspension of all ongoing military commissions;129 and (3) the 
suspension of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program.130 The first 
two executive orders were rendered null and void in fairly short order. 
As of this writing, Guantanamo Bay is still not closed and military 
commissions have now been fully approved by the Obama 
Administration.  
In spite of these so-called setbacks in the Obama vision, the 
Obama Administration still refuses to abandon its policy of using 
domestic criminal courts whenever possible. Starting with the June 
2009 transfer of al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatant Ahmed Ghailani 
from Guantanamo Bay to stand trial in New York federal district 
court, where he was convicted on only one count for his role in the al-
Qaeda terrorist bombings in Africa in 1998,131 and continuing with the 
trial of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,132 the Nigerian national who 
attempted to detonate an explosive device on an airplane traveling 
from Amsterdam to Detroit on December 25, 2009, the Obama 
Administration seeks every opportunity to downplay the use of the 
law of war, particularly in terms of domestic prosecution. President 
killed nearly 3,000 innocent people, and that is plotting to strike us 
again. And we will do whatever it takes to defeat them.” Id. 
127. See Charlie Savage, Developments Rekindle Debate Over Best Approach 
for Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at A14 (discussing 
the Obama Administration’s desire to use federal criminal law for 
terrorism suspects in and outside the United States).  
128. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009); see 
also Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009) 
(establishing a special task force on detainee disposition). 
129. 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899. 
130. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
131. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Brought to U.S. for Trial, 
WASH. POST, June 10, 2009, at A1. Ahmed Ghailani was transferred to 
a New York District Court on June 9, 2009, despite bipartisan 
opposition in Congress. This was the first case of a non-American 
detainee from Guantanamo Bay transferred to U.S. soil to stand trial. 
Id. Ghailani pleaded not guilty to multiple charges in connection with 
the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. United States v. 
Ghailani, 686 F.Supp.2d 279, 284–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the 
procedural history). 
132. Kevin Johnson, “Underwear Bomber” Trial Refreshed Security Debate, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 30 2011, at 6A. 
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Obama’s top counterterrorism expert, John Brennan, said that the 
October 2011 conviction of the so-called underwear bomber, 
Abdulmeutallab, in federal district court “showed why the 
administration strongly believes that terrorism suspects arrested 
inside the United States should be handled by the traditional system 
[domestic criminal law].”133  
Perhaps one of the most egregious instances of confused 
leadership in the Obama Administration occurred in November 2009. 
Despite the fact that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
deemed that those responsible for the attacks of 9/11 would be 
subject to the provisions of the law of war,134 i.e., members of the al-
Qaeda terror network, Attorney General Holder announced that five 
of the most senior members of al-Qaeda—Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
Walid Muhammad Bin Attash, Ramzi Bin Al Shibjh, Ali Abdul-Aziz 
Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Al Hawsawi—would be transferred from 
military custody in the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
to stand trial in domestic federal criminal court in the Southern 
District of New York for their roles in the 9/11 attacks.135 This move 
was roundly criticized for a variety of reasons: the phenomenal cost of 
holding the trial in New York City, security considerations associated 
with sparking violence by supporters of radical Islam, and continued 
trauma to the families.136 From the perspective of the rule of law, the 
most serious concern was embracing and upholding the proper rule of 
law—the law of war.137 Holder seemed oblivious to the fact that the 
five members of al-Qaeda had been detained for years in the 
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility without being charged with a 
domestic federal crime. These five are not common criminals but 
rather unlawful enemy combatants. Under the law of war, such 
detention is perfectly lawful. The reasonable observer would therefore 
expect that said unlawful enemy combatants would then be tried by a 
military commission. The proper rule of law would neither suggest nor 
support a domestic criminal trial.  
133. Savage, supra note 127 at A12. 
134. See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 170th 
Cong. § 2 (2001) (enacted).  
135. Accused 9/11 Plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Faces New York Trial, 
CNN (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/13/khalid 
.sheikh.mohammed/index.html.  
136. See generally Eugene R. Fidell, Op-Ed, The Trouble with Tribunals, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at WK8; see also Charlie Savage, U.S. 
Prepares to Lift Ban on Guantanamo Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, 
at A1.  
137. See Morning Meeting with Dylan Ratigan (MSNBC television broadcast 
Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.stmarytx.edu/ctl/index.php? 
site=centerForTerrorismLawMedia#mediaArchives. 
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When Holder announced this ill-thought out decision, the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009 (passed by the Democrat-dominated 
Congress) had already been signed into law. Again, all unlawful 
enemy combatants that had violated the law of war or other criminal 
acts should be processed for prosecution by means of a military 
commission, not a domestic criminal trial. Fortunately, the outcry 
from the American people was so great that the Obama 
Administration was forced to suspend the decision and finally, almost 
two years later, in March 2011, the Obama Administration lifted its 
self-imposed freeze on new military commission trials at Guantanamo 
Bay.138 Shortly thereafter, Attorney General Holder blamed Congress 
for his lack of perspicacity and reluctantly announced that he was 
“referring the cases [of the five al-Qaeda leaders] to the Department of 
Defense to proceed in military commissions. Furthermore, [he] 
directed prosecutors to move to dismiss the indictment that was 
handed down under seal in the Southern District of New York in 
December,j2009.139 
Even now, after the November 2012 election, the Obama 
Administration seems unable to understand the gravamen of the 
matter and simply will not concede the obvious: the proper rule of law 
must be used exclusively vis-a-vis the proper actor.  
The lengthy prepared remarks delivered by Attorney General Eric 
Holder at Northwestern University School of Law in March 2012 did 
absolutely nothing but add extra layers of misstatement and 
confusion.140 The speech was reviewed in some detail by various legal 
commentators141 because it provided the public with a rare 
explanation of the Obama Administration’s position on a variety of 
national security topics to include the legitimacy of the “reformed” 
military commissions, the reauthorization of portions of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, the use of domestic federal criminal 
courts, and the use of drone missile strikes to kill “terrorists” outside 
of what Holder called the “traditional battlefield.”142 While the 
opening portion of the speech refreshingly and correctly stated that 
“[w]e are a nation at war,” Holder quickly mired his remarks in 
confusing rhetoric by failing to distinguish between the “terrorist,” 
the “homegrown extremist,” and the “enemy belligerent.” Responding 
to critics of Obama’s use of a domestic federal criminal court in 
138. See Evan Perez, Obama Restarts Terrorism Tribunals, WALL ST. J., 
March 8, 2011, at A1.  
139. Holder, supra note 1. 
140. Holder, supra note 55. 
141. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Text of the Attorney General’s National 
Security Speech, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com 
/2012/03/text-of-the-attorney-generals-national-security-speech/. 
142. Holder, supra note 55. 
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handling the case of Abdulmutallab, Holder all but conceded that 
Abdulmutallab was in fact a member of al-Qaeda. Holder even 
detailed how Abdulmutallab was carrying out an act of jihad by going 
to the al-Qaeda training camp in Yemen where he met with a leader 
of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and was given detailed 
instructions on how to carry out the terror attack.143 Nevertheless, 
Holder simply lumped Abdulmutallab with other domestic jihadists 
like Faizal Shahzad, the naturalized American citizen who tried to set 
off a car bomb in New York City’s Time Square, and disingenuously 
boasted about how both were convicted in federal domestic courts.144 
Then, in the same paragraph of his remarks about Abdulmutallab, 
Holder referred to other “homegrown extremists” that have been 
convicted. Abdulmutallab was certainly not a homegrown extremist; 
he was an unlawful enemy combatant.  
The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab should never have been 
handled under the sphere of domestic criminal law. Once detained at 
the Detroit airport, President Obama had every right to designate 
Abdulmutallab an unlawful enemy combatant and to send him to a 
detention facility in Afghanistan or Cuba for questioning and, if 
appropriate, for prosecution in a military commission. Instead, the 
President elected to employ the rule of law associated with domestic 
criminal law for Abdulmutallab. Abdulmutallab knew he was an 
unlawful enemy combatant; at his sentencing in February 2012, 
Abdulmutallab loudly proclaimed that he was honored to be a 
member of al-Qaeda.145 As for Faisal Shahzad, he was an American 
citizen and could not have been tried in a military commission even if 
he were a member of al-Qaeda.146 Finally, to add insult to injury, 
Holder’s bait and switch logic regarding Abdulmutallab and Shahzad 
barely raised an eyebrow from the law students or their Northwestern 
law professors.  
Although unlawful enemy combatants are clearly qualified for 
killing or prosecution by means of military commissions, voices in and 
out of the government still view federal criminal law as the proper 
rule of law to apply,147 resulting in massive levels of misstatement and 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. See ‘Underwear Bomber’ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Handed Life 
Sentence, THE GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2012/feb/16/underwear-bomber-sentenced-life-prison. 
146. Holder, supra note 55.  
147. See Walter Slocombe, Critical Consideration of US’ Approaches and 
Methods of Treating Suspected Terrorists, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
DETENTION, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISTS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY AND CONDUCT 1 (Yonah Alexander et 
al. eds., 2011) (“Much of [terrorist detention, prosecution, and 
punishment] is illegal, immoral and even criminal.”).  
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misunderstanding.148 The term domestic terrorism can now have a 
dual meaning, and so it must now be viewed in the context of 
whether one is describing the terror acts of an unlawful enemy 
combatant in the United States or the acts of an individual, e.g., a 
non al-Qaeda domestic jihadist like Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who 
commits a terrorist act in the United States in violation of a state or 
federal criminal justice statute.149 In other words, when viewed from 
the lens of the War on Terror, the term domestic terrorism is best 
defined based on the identity of the subject involved in the act. Is the 
terrorist an unlawful enemy combatant or not? If he is an unlawful 
enemy combatant, then the appropriate responsive rule of law to 
apply is the law of war, not domestic criminal law.  
In the media reports surrounding what happened on the tenth 
anniversary of attacks on 9/11, the New York Times did not have a 
single story in its Monday, September 12, 2011, newspaper concerning 
the fact that the United States was engaged in a ten-year armed 
conflict or war with al-Qaeda. Instead, all of the stories were cloaked 
in the ambiguity of “terrorism.” The closest story to even attempt to 
deal with the topic of the lawful use of violence in armed conflict was 
entitled Around the World, Support for the U.S. is Mixed with 
Fatigue and Regret.150 The article talked about how nations from 
around the world marked the date by “expressing their commitment 
to democracy and the fight against terrorism.”151 The article then 
quoted a political analyst as saying that “most of Europe, the initial 
sympathy for America after 9/11 was ‘followed by a lack of 
enthusiasm . . . for the way 9/11 was exploited for political 
purposes.’”152 Such assessments should come as no surprise. As long as 
the United States is unable to provide clarity under the rule of law for 
its actions, the byproduct will be predictable: confusion. 
Al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatants qualify for treatment under 
the law of war, regardless of where they are located in the world. The 
Authorization for Use of Military Force contains no geographic 
restrictions concerning making war against al-Qaeda. As the 
commander-in-chief, President Obama has utilized the provisions of 
the law of war to engage in warfare. Thousands of al-Qaeda, Taliban, 
and associated forces have been killed by President Obama, mainly in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in other countries including Sudan, 
148. Holder, supra note 55. 
149. Nancy Gibbs, The Fort Hood Killer: Terrified . . . Or Terrorist?, TIME, 
Nov. 23, 2009, at 27 (exploring if the killing at Fort Hood was an 
“intimate act of war”).  
150. Steven Erlanger, Around the World, Support for the U.S. is Mixed with 
Fatigue and Regret, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A22. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
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Yemen, and Somalia. President Obama has detained hundreds of new 
enemy combatants at Bagram Air Force Base and continues to hold 
approximately 165 enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.153 
Attorney General Holder was correct in 2012 when he stated that 
“our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in 
Afghanistan.”154  
Finally, to be sure, the United States has self-restricted the law of 
war on U.S. soil, e.g., killing, detention, and prosecution by military 
commissions. It is the policy of the United States that anyone 
committing an act of terror on the homeland of America will be 
initially dealt with under domestic criminal law.155 Although 
American citizens may be killed and detained if they are al-Qaeda 
members, the Obama Administration has issued a signing statement 
to the FY 2012 defense appropriations bill that “[President Obama] 
would never let U.S. citizens be detained or interrogated under the 
law of war.”156 
IV. Targeted Killing 
In a report delivered to the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, defined targeted killing as “the intentional, 
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their 
agents acting under colour of law . . . against a specific individual who 
is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”157 Of course, the 
rule of law that justifies a state killing another human being rests in 
either the law of war or the long recognized customary international 
legal right of self-defense. Illegal state killings conducted outside of 
these two limited arenas are either murder158 or assassination.159 While 
the term murder is easily separated from the discussion because it 
generally applies to the use of force related to domestic criminal law, 
the term assassination is often misunderstood and thus misapplied by 
both policymakers and the media. Of course, this is somewhat 
153. The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES & NPR, http://projects.nytimes. 
com/guantanamo (last updated Dec. 11, 2012).  
154. Holder, supra note 55. 
155. See Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2002) (noting that the 9/11 attacks were 
punishable under domestic law). 
156. Obama’s Missing Detainees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2012, at A12. 
157. Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, ¶ 1 
(May 28, 2010). 
158. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1114. 
159. Id. at 130. 
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understandable given that the current executive order prohibiting 
assassination fails to even define the term. Executive Order 12,333 
reads: 
No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States 
government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, 
assassination.160 
If one accepts the common definition of assassination to mean “to 
murder (a prominent person) by surprise attack, as for political 
reasons,”161 then it is clear that Executive Order 12,333 does not make 
illegal something that was once legal. In other words, murder is 
always illegal. When the term assassination is used to describe a 
killing, such as the public announcement in May 2011 that Osama 
Bin Laden was killed,162 it follows that one would automatically 
presume that the killing was illegal. 
Perhaps one of the best short reviews of assassination was penned 
by W. Hays Parks, while he served at the Army Office of the Judge 
Advocate General, International and Operational Law Division.163 
Parks made clear that the purpose of Executive Order 12,333 was to 
ensure that the international community and the American people 
understood that the United States does not condone assassination “as 
an instrument of national policy.”164 Nevertheless, Parks correctly 
pointed out that as a matter of law, Executive Order 12,333 was not 
designed “to limit lawful self-defense options against legitimate 
threats to the national security of the United States or individual U.S. 
citizens.”165  
The term targeted killing is most often associated with the use of 
unmanned aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, to kill unlawful enemy 
combatants.166 These attack platforms have been in use in the War on 
160. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Aug. 27, 2004). 
161. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive Order on 
Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 751, 760 (2003). 
162. Emily Babay & Brian Hughes, Crowds Rejoice at White House after 
News of Bin Laden’s Death, WASH. EXAMINER (May 2, 2011), 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/113539. 
163. See Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for Law of 
War Matters to The Judge Advocate Gen. of the Army, Memorandum 
of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination (Nov. 2, 1989), 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/targetedkilling/
papers/ParksMemorandum.pdf. 
164. Id. at 8. 
165. Id. 
166. See Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot 
Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 
1201(2011). 
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Terror for a decade.167 The first targeted killing of an unlawful enemy 
combatant outside of the active war zone of Afghanistan occurred in 
November 2002 when a predator drone struck a car carrying Al-
Harethi and four others.168 Al-Harethi was an al-Qaeda member and 
suspect in the 2000 USS Cole attack in Yemen.169  
Since taking office, President Obama has demonstrated a 
predilection for the use of drones to kill unlawful enemy combatants. 
One commentator called Obama’s use of drones as a “remarkable 
turnaround for a politician who had criticized almost every aspect of 
the ‘war on Terror’ waged by his predecessor in the Oval Office.”170 
Under Obama, American drones have killed hundreds of suspected 
enemy combatants, mostly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also in 
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.171 From the time that Obama took office 
in 2009 until early 2012, there have been over 240 drone attacks in 
Pakistan alone, “with a death toll well over 1,300.”172 The use of a 
drone to kill deprives the subject of all his civil liberties. Unlike other 
issues such as detention authority, interrogation, or trial, a targeted 
killing provides no “appeal.” The goal is to kill.  
The primary legal theory for the Obama drone attacks is that the 
United States is at war. Unlawful enemy combatants are not killed 
because they are necessarily guilty of a crime, but because they are 
members of a hostile force.173 Again, the unlawful enemy combatant 
determination is made by the president, not by a court. Furthermore, 
the candidate on the President’s “kill list” may also fall into the 
category of “associated forces” of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In 
Hamlily v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit court sided with the Obama 
Administration’s view that the 2001 Authorization for Military Force 
extended to “associated forces” of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.174 In a 
companion case, Bensayah v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit noted:  
167. See Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted 
Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 151 (2010). 
168. Id. at 150. 
169. Id. 
170. William Shawcross, Terror on Trial, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2012, at C1. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. See Blum & Heymann, supra note 167, at 146. 
174. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63, 75 (D.D.C 2009) 
“Associated forces do not include terrorist organizations who merely 
share an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al 
Qaeda—there must be an actual association in the current conflict with 
al Qaeda or the Taliban.” Id. at 75 n.17. 
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[I]t is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of criteria for 
determining whether an individual is “part of” al Qaeda. That 
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a 
functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon 
the actions of the individual in relation to the organization.175  
In addition to the standard targeting considerations of 
proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and military necessity, it is 
well established that noncombatants may be killed if incidental to a 
lawful attack.176 This concept is known as collateral damage.  
While the military is authorized to conduct the actual killing, it is 
well-known that civilian contractors and the CIA also provide input 
in the intelligence gathering processes.177 The CIA will not release any 
information about their role in the use of drones,178 but the primary 
concern from a law of war perspective is whether or not the CIA and 
other civilian contractors are acting in accordance with supporting 
military operations in a defensive role and not actively participating 
in offensive operations.179  
Even if the United States were not at war, targeted killing could 
still be lawful under the longstanding concept of self-defense. In other 
words, the authority to use violence in war exists in tandem with the 
inherent right of state’s to defend themselves. The analytical 
framework for the use of force is found in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, which codifies the “inherent right of self-defense.” The 
inherent right of self-defense refers to the right of a country to 
unilaterally engage in acts of self-defense; regardless of what any other 
nation or organization, including the United Nations, may or may not 
do. This is a well-known and ancient component of international law:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
175. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
176. See Esther Hamutal Shamash, How Much is Too Much? An 
Examination of the Principal of Jus in Bello Proportionality, 2 ISRAELI 
DEF. FORCE L.R. 103, 106 (2006) (stating that the principle of 
proportionality represents a compromise between military necessity and 
the protection of civilians). 
177. See Radsan & Murphy, supra note 166, at 444. 
178. See id. at 446 (noting that the CIA is a clandestine organization). 
179. See ADDICOTT, supra note 20, at 274–80. 
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Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.180 
Parks sets out three different scenarios where self-defense may be 
used: (1) in response to an actual use of force; (2) in pre-emption of 
an imminent use of force; and (3) against a continuing threat.181 
Indeed, a prime example of this authority in action occurred on 
August 20, 1998, when President Bill Clinton ordered a targeted 
military strike on Afghanistan by means of more than seventy 
Tomahawk cruise missiles in direct response to the August 7, 1998, al-
Qaeda terror attack on the American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania.182  
While the general legal basis for targeted killing is rather 
elementary, the application in the War on Terror is often clouded due 
to the utter failure of the government to set out the authority with 
clarity. For instance, the confusion associated with whether the 2011 
American “drone” killing in Yemen of al-Qaeda cleric and leader, 
American-born Anwar al-Awlaki, was “legal” or not, reflects very 
poorly on the political leadership of the United States.183 Due to the 
inability of the commander-in-chief to lucidly articulate a legal 
justification divorced from political overtones, even people in the 
United States found it quite easy to accuse the country of 
wrongdoing. The New York Times editorial page on October 4, 2011, 
carried six letters to the editor on the topic of al-Awlaki’s death.184 Of 
those six letters, only one of them understood that the killing was an 
entirely lawful act carried out under the law of war. All the others 
reflected varying degrees of confusion that included sentiments that 
the United States was: (1) wrong for not operating under domestic 
criminal law to arrest al-Awlaki; (2) wrong for killing a U.S. citizen; 
or (3) that the rule of law didn’t really matter because al-Awlaki was 
a “bad guy” and “we have to do what we have to do (the law of the 
jungle).”185  
180. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
181. Parks, supra note 163, at 7–8. 
182. Richard J. Newman et al., America Fights Back, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP’T (Aug. 23, 1998), http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles 
/980831/archive_004624.htm.  
183. See Greg Miller, Strike on Aulaqi Demonstrates Collaboration Between 
CIA and Military, WASH. POST Sept. 30, 2011, http://articles.washing 
tonpost.com/2011-0930/world/35272700_1_lethal-operations-cia-direc 
tor-qaeda. 
184. Letters to the Editor, The Killing of a Qaeda Leader in Yemen, NY. 
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, at A22. 
185. Id. 
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Amazingly, not a single voice in the Obama Administration took 
the time to defend the action as lawful under a simple set of legal 
parameters related to the law of war. Instead, the White House issued 
statements associated with the fact that we were “defending” 
ourselves against a terrorist,186 even though the foundational rule of 
law justification has nothing to do with the fact that al-Awlaki was a 
“terrorist” or a bad person. The justification for America’s lawful use 
of force against al-Awlaki was as follows: (1) the United States is at 
war with al-Qaeda; (2) the law of war rule of law applies to this war, 
not the domestic criminal law rule of law; (3) the law of war allows 
the United States to kill on sight any unlawful enemy combatant, 
detain indefinitely any unlawful enemy combatant, or use military 
commissions when appropriate (unless the nation imposes self-
restrictions).  
It took a full seven months after the killing of al-Awlaki before 
Attorney General Holder finally offered his “thoughts” on targeted 
killing at his March 5, 2012 address to Northwestern School of Law. 
He indicated that the United States would kill by drone or otherwise 
when: (1) the subject is located abroad; (2) the subject is a senior 
operational figure; (3) the subject is a member of al-Qaeda, Taliban, 
or associated forces; (4) the subject is involved in planning operations 
focused on killing Americans; (5) the threat is imminent and an 
opportunity to kill is open; (6) there is no feasible option for capture; 
and (7) the use of violence will comply with the law of war.187 
In the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, if he was a member of al-Qaeda 
(and he was), then he qualified for treatment under the full 
parameters of the law of war. Thus, it is not a violation of the law of 
war for the United States to kill an American citizen al-Qaeda 
member without warning. In addition, if that American citizen is an 
unlawful enemy combatant, then the United States can use the law of 
war as the proper rule of law to deal with him. While it is true that 
the 2006 (as well as the updated 2009) Military Commissions Act did 
exclude American citizen al-Qaeda members from trial by military 
commissions, this is a self-imposed rule, not a rule mandated by the 
law of war.  
V. Rendition 
In tandem with the issue of targeted killing, the matter of 
rendition has been a lightning rod for debate when used in the 
context of the War on Terror. Simply put, rendition188 refers to the 
186. Holder, supra note 55. 
187. See id. 
188. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1410 (defining rendition as 
the “return of a fugitive from one state to the state where the fugitive is 
accused or convicted of a crime”). 
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long-standing practice of one state sending a non-citizen individual to 
another state.189 The practice is not illegal per se and the 
government’s authority to engage in rendition stems from the 
president’s authority under Article II.190 The act of rendition only 
becomes illegal under a limited set of circumstances. The seminal legal 
instrument in this regard is the 1984 United Nations Convention 
Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (Torture Convention).191 Article 3 of the Torture 
Convention prohibits any state party to “expel, return (“refouler”) or 
extradite any person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds to believe that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.”192 The more common euphemism for this illegal practice is 
“extraordinary rendition,”193 although it should be properly 
categorized as “illegal rendition.”  
In making the determination as to whether an illegal rendition has 
occurred, the state party is required by Article 3(2) to “take into 
account all relevant considerations” with particular regard to whether 
or not there exists “a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights”194 in the receiving state. Even though the 
Torture Convention’s combined factors of “substantial grounds,” 
coupled with “a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights,” provide considerable flexibility for a state 
189. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (holding 
that the practice of bringing a defendant into the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States by force is generally lawful per the Ker-
Frisbie Doctrine). 
190. See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 
1205 (2004) (“[T]he historical record unequivocally demonstrates that 
the President has exercised unchallenged and exclusive control over 
individuals captured during military operations since the time of the 
Founding.”). 
191. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 67, pmbl. (setting forth the 
standards of treatment for all persons and the universal rejection of 
“torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment throughout the world”). The convention provides a clear 
definition of torture, although it is lacking any definition of “other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.” See id. 
192. Id. art. 3. See also Jules Lobel, The Prevention Paradigm and the Perils 
of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1408 (2007) (discussing 
the act of knowingly using rendition to a State that tortures). 
193. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1410 (defining extraordinary 
rendition as “transfer, without formal charges, trial, or court approval, 
of a person suspected of being a terrorist or supporter of a terrorist 
group to a foreign nation”). 
194. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 67, art. 3(2).  
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party to justify a particular rendition, at least the prohibition is 
established and a standard is established, albeit a subjective one. 
Surprisingly, Article 16 has no similar requirement regarding rendition 
to a state that engages in “other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment,” shortened to the term “ill-treatment.” For all practical 
purposes, this means that a state is free to turn over an individual to 
a state that it actually knows engages in ill-treatment. In practice, the 
United States relies heavily on assurances from the host state via 
diplomatic channels that the non-citizen will not be subjected to 
torture or ill-treatment.195 
Because the Senate’s ratification of the Torture Convention 
expressly mandated that the treaty was not “self-executing,”196 
Congress passed legislation to implement Article 3 of the Torture 
Convention as part of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring 
Act of 1998 (FARRA).197 Curiously, however, in terms of rendition 
the FARRA only provided a policy statement without legal effect. 
The pertinent provision states: 
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, 
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any 
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for 
believing that person would be in physical danger of being 
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is 
physically present in the United States.198 
In the War on Terror, the concern over illegal rendition centers 
on the transfer of an individual from the United States to another 
country.199 Since detainees are illegal enemy combatants, they are not 
prisoners of war and thus not subject to protection of the Geneva 
Conventions as a bar to any transfer whatsoever. Law Professor 
Robert Chesney argues quite persuasively that because of the 
definition of “protected persons” in the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
195. See Roger Strother, Obama Administration to Continue Extraordinary 
Rendition Program, Promises Oversight, OMB WATCH (Aug. 25, 2009), 
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10336. 
196. See 136 CONG. REC. 36, 198 (1990). 
197. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
227, § 1242(a)–(b), 112 Stat. 2691-761, 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1231 note (2006)) [hereinafter FARRA]. 
198. Id. § 1242(a). 
199. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 180–83 (1993) 
(holding that Article 3 of the Torture Convention only applies to 
transfers of persons from U.S. shores to another country). 
299 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Rightly Dividing the Domestic Jihadist from the Enemy Combatant 
al-Qaeda, Taliban, and associated forces are not covered and thus are 
all candidates for rendition.200 
While the Clinton Administration engaged in rendition of terror 
suspects prior to 9/11, the Bush Administration engaged in lawful 
rendition of detainees as well. According to the left-leaning Center for 
Human Rights and Global Justice, however, the United States 
engaged in illegal rendition by sending non-citizens to such countries 
as “Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria.”201 
Although candidate Obama strongly condemned rendition in the Bush 
Administration when running for office in 2007, he quickly reversed 
his position after the election and as a practical matter adopted the 
entire rendition policy that he had so strongly condemned as torture 
and illegal.202 The 2009 Obama executive order condoned the practice 
of rendition but promised more oversight in the process to ensure that 
torture does not occur.203 As a practical matter, over the past four 
years, the Obama Administration has utilized the practice sparingly, 
if at all.204  
VI. Conclusion 
“During the Nuremberg trials, part of what made us different was 
even after those Nazis had performed atrocities that no one had ever 
seen before, we still gave them a day in court, and that taught the 
entire world about who we are.”205 
—Barack Obama 
 
While some may argue that the fault for the confusion associated 
with unlawful enemy combatants versus domestic jihadi terrorists 
rests with the lack of international consensus on relevant standards 
that should be adopted to deal with “international terrorism,” the 
root cause for this confusion actually centers on the inability of the 
Obama Administration to properly distinguish al-Qaeda unlawful 
enemy combatant terrorists from domestic jihadi terrorists. This 
200. See Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of 
International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 737 (2006). 
201. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK & THE CTR. FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., TORTURE BY PROXY: 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY 
RENDITIONS” 8 (2004). 
202. David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, but With More 
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009 
/08/25/us/politics/25rendition.html.  
203. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
204. Obama’s Missing Detainees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2012, at A12. 
205. Shawcross, supra note 170. 
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confusion began in small measures in the Bush Administration but 
has been magnified to absurd degrees in the Obama Administration. 
Obama’s ill-conceived attempts to close Guantanamo Bay, stop 
military commissions, prosecute senior enemy combatants in New 
York federal district court, and generally refuse to acknowledge with 
any regularity to the public that America is engaged in a real “war” 
with al-Qaeda has produced massive distortion and consternation 
about the legality of our actions.  
The reason that all this matters, is that if the United States is 
operating under the rule of law associated with domestic criminal law 
vis-à-vis al-Qaeda, then America has engaged in horrid violations of 
domestic and international law in the past eleven years by killing al-
Qaeda members on sight, detaining al-Qaeda members indefinitely 
without trial, and using military commissions to prosecute al-Qaeda 
members. On the other hand, if America is in a real war, then all of 
these actions are perfectly lawful. 
The number one threat facing the United States comes from a 
loose confederation of radicalized violent Islamic jihadists who engage 
in terrorism as the preferred tactic of murder. Some qualify as 
unlawful enemy combatants and some do not. While all al-Qaeda 
unlawful enemy combatants can be labeled as “violent jihadists,” not 
all violent jihadists are unlawful enemy combatants. In this light, 
violent jihadists that do not qualify as unlawful enemy combatants 
must be deemed as domestic jihadist terrorists, but violent jihadists 
that do qualify as unlawful enemy combatants must be treated under 
the law of war. Out of all of the nascent legal and policy issues 
associated with the armed conflict against al-Qaeda, no factor has 
spawned more debate than correctly applying this separation. The 
inability to clearly set bright lines of distinction between al-Qaeda 
unlawful enemy combatants and domestic jihadists is not just a 
failure in definition, it is a failure in leadership and does tremendous 
damage to America’s commitment to abide by the proper rule of law. 
America must be able to clearly distinguish between criminals and 
combatants and then apply the appropriate rule of law to each 
category.  
The distinction set out in this paper between an unlawful enemy 
combatant and a domestic jihadist is not that difficult to delineate. 
As the commander-in-chief, one of the president’s main roles is to 
ensure that America acts under the correct rule of law. Because the 
War on Terror is fought against a non-state actor, it is imperative 
that the president make this distinction precise so that not only our 
enemies understand that we are following the appropriate rule of law, 
but the American people and our allies understand as well. Only then 
can we validate our behavior as operating under the rule of law. 
President Obama’s March 2011 executive order regarding the start of 
new trials by military commissions and the legality of indefinite 
detention is a step in the right direction, but it still sends confused 
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signals because it leaves open the option to try unlawful enemy 
combatants in federal district courts. Acting in accordance with the 
new discipline of “lawfare,” coined by the Major General (US Air 
Force, ret.) Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Executive Director, Center on 
Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of 
Law,206 clarity mandates that the commander-in-chief firmly 
communicate the distinction between a domestic jihadist and an 
unlawful enemy combatant, and properly apply the appropriate rule 
of law in each and every instance. Only then can one speak 
intelligently about rendition and targeted killing. 
Considering that the hallmark of any democratic government is 
its commitment to the rule of law, a rational discussion of the rule of 
law vis-à-vis domestic terrorism means applying the appropriate legal 
response to an attack (or attempted attack) on the American 
homeland. This mandates a clear understanding of what one means 
by domestic terrorism and which rule of law applies—domestic 
criminal law or the law of war? The American government must do a 
far better job in correctly dividing the application of the term when it 
comes to discussions of violent jihadist threats.  
 
206. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving 
Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Ctr. for Human 
Rts. Pol’y, Harvard Kennedy Sch. Program on Nat’l Sec. and Human 
Rts., Workshop Paper, 2001), available at http://www.hks.harvard. 
edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap200
1.pdf.  
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